add "(if any)" regarding keying in the security notes

2 files changed, 10 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/c/README.md b/c/README.md
index 06e7a00..6807bee 100644
--- a/c/README.md
+++ b/c/README.md
@@ -197,12 +197,13 @@ bits of collision resistance, for any N up to 256. Longer outputs don't provide
 security.
 
 Avoid relying on the secrecy of the output offset, that is, the number of output bytes read or
-the `seek` argument of `blake3_hasher_finalize_seek`. [_Block-Cipher-Based Tree
+the arguments to [`seek`](struct.OutputReader.html#method.seek) or
+[`set_position`](struct.OutputReader.html#method.set_position). [_Block-Cipher-Based Tree
 Hashing_ by Aldo Gunsing](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/283) shows that an attacker who knows
-both the message and the key can easily determine the offset of an extended output. For
-comparison, AES-CTR has a similar property: if you know the key, you can decrypt a block from
-an unknown position in the output stream to recover its block index. Callers with strong secret
-keys aren't affected in practice, but secret offsets are a [design
+both the message and the key (if any) can easily determine the offset of an extended output.
+For comparison, AES-CTR has a similar property: if you know the key, you can decrypt a block
+from an unknown position in the output stream to recover its block index. Callers with strong
+secret keys aren't affected in practice, but secret offsets are a [design
 smell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_smell) in any case.
 
 # Building
diff --git a/src/lib.rs b/src/lib.rs
index 7d455ff..a2418df 100644
--- a/src/lib.rs
+++ b/src/lib.rs
@@ -1355,10 +1355,10 @@ impl std::io::Write for Hasher {
 /// the arguments to [`seek`](struct.OutputReader.html#method.seek) or
 /// [`set_position`](struct.OutputReader.html#method.set_position). [_Block-Cipher-Based Tree
 /// Hashing_ by Aldo Gunsing](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/283) shows that an attacker who knows
-/// both the message and the key can easily determine the offset of an extended output. For
-/// comparison, AES-CTR has a similar property: if you know the key, you can decrypt a block from
-/// an unknown position in the output stream to recover its block index. Callers with strong secret
-/// keys aren't affected in practice, but secret offsets are a [design
+/// both the message and the key (if any) can easily determine the offset of an extended output.
+/// For comparison, AES-CTR has a similar property: if you know the key, you can decrypt a block
+/// from an unknown position in the output stream to recover its block index. Callers with strong
+/// secret keys aren't affected in practice, but secret offsets are a [design
 /// smell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_smell) in any case.
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct OutputReader {